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REGULATION BEST INTEREST: WILL THE

SEC ALTER THE "BEST INTEREST" STANDARD?

*Robert Bullington
I. INTRODUCTION
In late January 2021, a group of inexperienced investors brought together through Reddit
created a "meme bubble" that sharply inflated, and subsequently depressed, the stock price of
companies such as Gamestop Corp. ("Gamestop") and AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc. 1 This
event swiftly led to investor advocate groups calling for clarity of financial market player
compensation and, more importantly, stronger guardrails to protect retail investors.2 The Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"), which regulates brokers and broker-dealers, quickly
responded to this outcry by prioritizing examinations focused on "risks associated with app-based
platforms with interactive or 'game-like' features that are intended to influence customers." 3
Although not expressly stated in FINRA's annual report, the regulatory authority clearly believes
that this excessive trading spike led investors to make unsuitable purchases for their investment
profile.4 With the rise of app-based trading, commission-free brokerage models, and social media,
investors now more than ever have easy access to the financial markets. The question is: where or
how are these inexperienced investors receiving investment advice?

* J.D. Candidate, May 2023, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
1 See Martha White, Gamestop Madness Presents a Challenge for Biden's Potential SEC Chief, NBC NEws (Feb. 1,
2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/markets/gamestop-madness-presents-challenge-new-sec-chief-nl256416.

See id.

2

3 FINRA, 2021 REPORT ON FINRA' S EXAMINATION AND RISK MONITORING PROGRAM 2 (2021)

a See Bob Pisani, Wall Street Worries about Regulatory Fallout from the GameStop Sage, CNBC (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/04/wall-street-worries-about-regulatory-fallout-from-the-gamestop-saga.html.

1

A majority of the investors who participated in the GameStop "meme bubble" purchased
shares through Robinhood Financial ("Robinhood"). 5 In fact, at the peak of the trading boom,
Robinhood was the most-downloaded free app in the Apple App Store.6 Critics claim that
Robinhood's aggressive marketing to young, inexperienced investors, encouraged its clients to
"gamble on stock market movements and risk big losses." 7 Robinhood, however, is a self-directed
brokerage platform that allows investors complete control over how they invest their money
without advice from a financial professional.' Since traditional investment advice offered through
a financial professional has effectively been removed from this particular investing equation,
investors are not likely to have a viable claim of redress against Robinhood or any like brokerage
apps for purchases of "meme bubble" stocks.9 While this bubble was seemingly an isolated
incident fueled by individuals who wanted to be part of the craze, nearly one-third of the investing
public still consults financial professionals prior to investing their hard-earned savings.10
Traditionally, when "mom and pop" or non-professional investors ("retail investors")
sought investment advice for their individual portfolio, retirement account, etc. they enlisted the
services of a Registered Investment Advisor ("RIA" or "IA"). On the other hand, more affluent
clients who handled their own finances utilized the services of a broker-dealer ("BD") to execute
their investment transactions without the personalized investment advice. Over the past two

' See Kate Kelly et al., Robinhood, in Need of Cash, Raises $1 Billion From Its Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/29/technology/robinhood-fundraising.html.
6See

'

id.

Id.
See Jordan

Wathen, What is a Self-Directed Brokerage Account?, THE ASCENT (Nov.
https://www.fool.com/the-ascent/buying-stocks/articles/what-is-a-self-directed-brokerage-account/.
8

20,

2018),

9 See RobinhoodRestrictsPurchasesof GameStop, AMC, Other Securities -Do You Have a Claim?, STOCK MARKET
Loss (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.stockmarketloss.com/uncategorized/robinhood-restricts-purchases-of-gamestopamc-other-securities-do-you-have-a-claim/.

See Michelle Fox, 99% of Americans Don't Use a FinancialAdvisor
Here's Why, CNBC (Nov. 11, 2019)
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/ 11/99percent-of-americans-dont-use-a-financial-advisor-heres-why.html.
1

2

decades, however, BD's responsibilities have shifted from "executing client trades for stocks and
other securities to providing broader investment advice" to retail clients." Although the lines
between services has blurred, the standard of care afforded to the investor by each business model
still differs." "BDs have generally made recommendations under a suitability standard, a FINRA
rule requiring that the investment advice is merely consistent with the customers' interests.""
RIAs, on the other hand, are held to a fiduciary standard which is a legal obligation that enacts a
more stringent standard of care than the suitability standard. 14
For years, financial industry participants have urged lawmakers and regulators to merge
the two standards of care under the stricter fiduciary standard in order to best protect investors.15
On June 5, 2019, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") took a step closer to merging
such standards by voting to adopt Regulation Best Interest ("Reg BI").16 Although Reg BI did not
expressly merge the separate standards of care, it did replace the suitability standard with a "best
interest" standard." While the "best interest" standard is more stringent than that of suitability,
many industry professionals still believe it falls short of the protections afforded to IA clients. 18
The intent of Reg BI was to create retail investor protections against bad actors while still allowing

" Adam Hayes, Regulation Best Interest (BI), INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/what-isthe-sec-s-regulation-bi-best-interest-rule-4689542.
12

See GARY SHORTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46115, REGULATION BEST INTEREST (REG BI): THE SEC's RULE FOR

BROKER-DEALERS (2020).
13

Id.

" See id.
15

See Id.

Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard
(Jun. 5, 2019) [hereinafterRegulation Best Interest].
16

1"

See id.

18

See SHORTER, supra note 12, at 14-9, 21, 23.

of Conduct Release No. 34-86031, 84 FED. REG. 134, 33318

investors to choose the right investment advice to fit their needs. 19 Despite these intents, critics of
the rule still hold that, for brokers, Reg BI fails to put the investor first. 20
The implementation date for all BDs to comply with Reg BI was June 30, 2020.21 In the
initial round of inspections for compliance with the rule, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton noted that
"firms generally are, indeed, meeting their compliance obligation."2 2 Despite the money, time, and
effort firms used to rollout new procedures and communications for retail investors, some
Democratic Representatives insist that President Biden should issue an executive order to halt Reg
BI in hopes of further merging the two investor protection standards. 23 These representatives are
likely to push the issue even further after the Congressional hearing of Robinhood, Reddit, Citadel,
and Melvin Capital on February 28, 202124 or after Congressional confirmation of a new SEC
chairperson.
This article will primarily discuss the purpose of Reg BI and its ultimate effect on retail
investors who utilize BD services. The article will also explore the future of Reg BI, including
potential changes aimed at clarifying the best interest standard and further merging the BD and IA
standards of care. Part I provides an overview of Reg BI including a brief description of the
services offered by both BDs and IAs. Part II discusses the history of Reg BI, why the SEC decided
to change the standards of each model, and ultimately why the SEC decided not to harmonize the

19

See id.

20

See id. at 15.

21

See Regulation Best Interest, supra note 16, at 33400.

22 SEC, STATEMENT AT THE SEC's STAFF ROUNDTABLE ON REGULATION BEST INTEREST
AND FORM CRS (Oct. 26,

2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-statement-roundtable-reg-best-interest-crs-102620
[hereinafterRoundtable Statement].
See Letter from Maxine Waters, Chairwoman, H.R. Comm. on Fin. Services, to Joseph Biden, Pres.-elect
(Dec. 4,
2020), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/120420_cmw_ltrtobiden.pdf [hereinafter Waters Letter].
23

See Maggie Fitzgerald, Here's What to Expect from Thursday's GamesStop hearing with Robinhood, Citadel and
Reddit CEOs, CNBC (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/17/gamestop-hearing-what-to-expect-fromrobinhood-reddit-and-citadel. html.
24

4

fiduciary standard between both types of service providers. Part III analyzes the current state of
Reg BI, specifically balancing the purpose of the rule with the ultimate protections afforded to
retail investors. Part IV concludes that the rule will not change since the original intent was to
afford investors better protections while still allowing individual choice. However, a combination
of state fiduciary standards, aggressive examinations by the regulators, and a focus on investor
education will merge the two standards ever closer.

II. THE HISTORY OF REG BI AND STANDARDS OF CARE
During the early 1990s, BDs increasingly began expanding the scope of their services,
including offering investment advice "somewhat akin to IAs." 25 As one study noted, the industry
is becoming increasingly complex, firms are becoming more heterogenous and intertwined, and
investors do not have a "clear understanding of the different functions and fiduciary
responsibilities of financial professionals." 2 6 In response to this confusion, a 2011 SEC study
recommend "establishing a uniform fiduciary standard for investment advisors and broker-dealers
when providing investment advice about securities to retail customers that is consistent with the
standard that currently applies to investment advisors." 2 7 In 2016, the Obama Administration's
Department of Labor ("DOL") adopted new rules under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA") which, among other things, deemed BDs to be fiduciaries while providing
recommendations to retirement plan participants. 2 8 On March 15, 2018, the Fifth Circuit Court of

supra note 12, at 3.

25 SHORTER,
26

Rand

Corporation,

Investment

Advisers

and

Broker-Dealers, Research

Brief

RB-9337

(2008),

https://www.rand.org/pubs/researchbriefs/RB9337/indexl.html [hereinafter Rand Corporation].
27

SEC,

Study

on

Investment

Advisers

and

Broker-Dealers

(Jan.

2011),

https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
See Dep't. of Labor Definition of the Term 'Fiduciary'; Conflict of Interest Rule - Retirement Investment
Advice,
81 Fed. Reg. 68, 20946 (April 8, 2016).
28

5

Appeals ruled that the DOL exceeded its statutory authority under ERISA. 29 The Trump
Administration's DOL decided not to challenge the Fifth Circuit's decision thereby effectively
halting the implementation of the rules.3 0
The issue quickly reemerged in 2019 when the DOL announced that it was working with
the SEC to promulgate new rules31 and to have those rules "track as closely as possible with [the]
SEC's best interest regulation."" On June 5, 2019 the SEC approved parts of a final rule related
to the duty of care financial professionals owe to retail investors, including Regulation Best
Interest. The rule release stated:
Regulation Best Interest enhances the broker-dealer standard of conduct beyond
existing suitability obligations, and aligns the standard of conduct with retail
customers' reasonable expectations by requiring broker-dealers, among other
things, to: Act in the best interest of the retail customer at the time the
recommendation is made, without placing the financial or other interest of the
broker-dealer ahead of the interests of the retail customer.3 3
While the rule enhanced the BD standard of conduct "beyond existing suitability
obligations,"" the rule failed to follow the SEC's 2011 guidance of implementing one common
fiduciary standard. The SEC expressly stated that though Reg BI "draws from key fiduciary
principals," it is not a fiduciary standard.

29

5

Some have argued that the components of Reg BI

See Chamber of Com. v. Dept. of Labor, 885 F.3d. 360, 397-8 (5th Cir. 2018).
Dep't.

of Labor,
Fiduciary Rule and Prohibited Transaction
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?publd=201810&RIN=1210AB82&operation=OPERATION_PRINT_RULE.
30

31

Exemptions,

(Fall

2018)

See Brian Croce, DOL Working with SEC on FiduciaryRule, Labor SecretarySays, PENSIONS & INV. (May 2, 2019),

https://www.pionline.com/article/20190502/ONLINE/190509965/dol-working-with-sec-on-fiduciary-rule-laborsecretary-says.
32 Brian Croce and Hazel Bradford, Scalia on Tap to Replace Scandal-TaintedAcostaat DOL, PENSIONS
& INV. (July
22, 2019), https://www.pionline.com/washington/scalia-tap-replace-scandal-tainted-acosta-dol.
33 Regulation Best Interest, supra note 16, at 33, 318.
34

Id.

35

Id. at 33, 333.
6

essentially give rise to a fiduciary standard without the express codification. 36 However, this is
difficult to qualify since "best interest" is never specifically defined in the rule.37 The failure to
define the very standard for which the regulation is named left much confusion as to the
expectations of Reg BI and even more political disagreement as to whether the rule went far
enough to protect retail investors nationwide. 38
So why didn't the SEC follow their own 2011 report and implement a fiduciary standard
across both RIAs and BDs? The commentary to the final rule stated that the SEC did not adopt a
one size fits all approach since it could potentially "risk reducing investor choice and access to
existing products, services, service providers, and payment options, and would increase costs for
firms and for retail investors in both broker-dealer and investment adviser relationships."

39

SEC

Chairman Clayton echoed these views when noting that the RIA model and BD model starkly
differ in the manner of payment for their services. 40 While BDs get paid a commission on a
transaction by transaction basis, RIAs are a more long-term relationship where the advisor gets
paid a quarterly or annual fee. 41 Despite the confusion created by the lack of clarity in the rule, the
SEC strongly believes that both models and benefits thereof are essential to retail investors'
varying investment strategies. The bottom line for the SEC, Clayton noted, was to "rais[e] the
standard of conduct for broker-dealers - the obligations that they owe to their clients." 4 2

36 See, e.g., D. Bruce Johnsen, A Transaction Cost Assessment ofSEC Regulation Best Interest, 2018 COLUM. BUs. L.
REV. 695, 698.

37 Regulation Best Interest, supra note 16, at 33,491-92.
38

See Yerv Melkonyan, Regulation Best Interestand the State-Agency Conflict, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1591, 1602.

39 See Regulation Best Interest, supra note 16, at 33,332.
4

See Melanie Waddell, SEC's Clayton Explains 'BestInterest' vs. 'Fiduciary'Duty, THINKADVISOR (Jun. 6,
2009),

https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2019/06/06/secs-clayton-explains-best-interest-vs-fiduciary-duty/.
4

See id.

42 Id.

7

III. REG BI CURRENT STATE
The implementation date for all BDs to comply with Reg BI was June 30, 2020,43 despite
calls from industry participants to delay the implementation date due to the COVID-19
pandemic. 44 Although the economic shutdowns were a blow to business continuity across the
financial services industry, the SEC believed that major retail brokerage firms had already made
substantial progress toward meeting the requirements for Reg BI and it would not be fair to further
delay. 45 While keeping the original implementation date completely contradicted the norms of
society throughout 2020, the SEC did have some data supporting the decision. For instance,
Raymond James estimated that it would spend $20 million in initial costs to prepare for Reg BI,
plus another $5 million annually. 46 Further, SEC Chairman Clayton stated that "continued
implementation of these conduct and transparency initiatives, individually and collectively, will
significantly benefit Main Street Investors." 47 Despite the SEC's good-faith beliefs, only about
80% of firms expressed a moderate to high level of confidence in meeting the stated compliance
date prior to June 30, 2020.48

43

See Regulation Best Interest, supra note 16, at 33,400.

See Nick Thornton, SEC Chair Clayton: COVID-19 Will Not Delay Reg BI, BENEFITSPRO (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.benefitspro.com/2020/04/02/sec-chair-clayton-covid- 19-will-not-delay-regbi/?slretum=20210125135547.
as

as See id.
See Tobias Salinger, Is Wealth Management Readyfor Reg BI? Its Complicated, FINANCIAL PLANNING
(April 27,
2020), https://www.financial-planning.com/news/sec-reg-bi-to-bring-more-broker-dealer-documentation
46

47 SEC, INVESTORS REMAIN FRONT OF MIND AT THE SEC: APPROACH TO ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES, OVERSIGHT
AND RULEMAKING;
IMPLEMENTATION
OF REGULATION BEST
INTEREST AND FORM
CRS, (2020)

https://www. sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-investors-rbi-form-crs.
See Jillian Enoch et al., Regulation Best Interest: How Wealth Management Firms are Implementing the Rule
Package, (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/regulatory/us-regulationbest-interest-survey-report.pdf.
48

8

Nearly seven months after the implementation date, the SEC noted that firms are generally
meeting their compliance obligations. 49 This apparent success is not surprising to industry
participants given that the SEC and FINRA have yet to dive deep into how retail investors are
actually protected by the rule. Two months prior to implementation, the SEC and FINRA noted
that the first six months of examinations would solely be used to evaluate firm approaches to Reg
BI implementation. 50 After that initial period, Reg BI exams would gradually increase in scope
and focus." This gradual ramp-up period will allow regulators to pull back the curtain and
determine if the rule has achieved its intended effects. In the first six months of limited Reg BI
exams, however, the SEC has noted shortcomings related to adequate disclosure of fees, costs and
revenue sharing, and conflicts related to compensation practices.

2

Despite these shortcomings,

both FINRA and the SEC have yet to bring any formal regulatory action against firms.
Not all lawmakers are enamored with the new rule or the dawdling enforcement approach
taken by financial regulators. House Financial Services Committee Chairwoman Maxine Waters,
D-Calif., has gone as far as formally asking President Joe Biden to reverse Reg Bl.5 3 Waters feels
that Wall Street, not main street, benefits from decreased oversight and lax enforcement.5 4 She
believes that strengthening enforcement and rolling back Trump-era actions will "again put
investors first." 5 5 In direct contrast to Waters' comments, the Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association's ("SIFMA") chief executive urged lawmakers to give the rule time to play

49

See Roundtable Statement, supra note 22.

50 See Melanie Waddell, SEC Reg BI, Form CRS Exams to Start in July, THINKADVISOR
(May 19, 2020),
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2020/05/19/sec-reg-bi-form-crs-exams-to-start-in-july/.
51 See id.
52 See Roundtable Statement, supra note 22.
53

See Waters Letter, supra note 23.

54 See id.
55

Id.

9

out before revisiting. 56 SIFMA's statements appear to be more motivated by economics than by
investor protections 7 due to the fact that the industry does not want to throw away the time, money,
and effort spent on implementation.
Politics and motivations aside, there has never been a more prudent time than now for
increased investor protection. Since the beginning of the pandemic, cash deposits are at an all-time
high.5 8 The continued distribution and success of COVID vaccinations has led to continued
economic reopening and increased travel. A successful transition of political power has added
some stability in the markets. Additionally, the Federal Reserve Bank has demonstrated that it will
do whatever is necessary to keep the economy afloat. All of these factors contribute to investors'
increased willingness to take their cash off the sidelines and put it to work by investing in the
financial markets, as evidenced by the meme bubble and all-time high major index levels.

59

Although formal regulatory actions have yet to be passed down for Reg BI failures, that does not
equate to investor protection success. So how will the SEC and the Biden administration handle
these concerns?

IV. REG BI FUTURE STATE
Since President Joe Biden entered the White House, the financial services industry has
questioned whether Reg BI will remain in its current form. Reg BI has been politically motivated

See Mark Schoeff Jr., SIFMA Wants New SEC to Give Reg BI Time to Work, INVESTMENTNEW S (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.investmentnews.com/sifma-wants-new-sec-to-give-reg-bi-time-to-work-200119.
56

s See id.
See Jessica Dickler, Savings InterestRates Hit Rock Bottom Just as Americans Stash Away More Cash, CNBC (Jan.
13, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/13/savings-interest-rates-hit-rock-bottom-as-bank-deposits-balloon.html

58

59 See Hamza Shaban & Heather Long, The Stock Market is Ending 2020 at Record Highs, even as the Virus Surges

and

Millions
go
Hungry,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/12/3 1/stock-market-record-2020/.

10

(Dec.

31,

2020),

since its genesis and new administrations tend to overturn certain partisan acts of their
predecessors. 60 Remember, Reg BI came about when former President Donald Trump's
administration moved to erase the DOL fiduciary rule, part of former President Barack Obama's
legacy. 6 1 While President Biden has indicated that he supports a uniform fiduciary duty, he has not
made any indication in his first 100 days that he intends to put a stop to the rule through an
executive order in accordance with Maxine Waters' wishes. 62 What he has done, however, is
appoint former chairman of the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission, Gary Gensler, to
head the SEC. 63 At this point, Gensler's nomination is all but confirmed and the anticipation as to
his priorities continues to build. 64
One thing that individuals from both sides of the aisle can agree on is that Gensler must
address many prevalent issues, and Reg BI is near the top of that list. 65 However, from the outset
of his tenure items such as meme stocks and cryptocurrencies may take the front seat. 66 Since the
election was called this fall, some commentators and analysts have suggested various paths for
Reg BI. One of those changes is simple, but important: changing the name of Reg B.

67

Some say

that the name is grossly misleading since it is not a true fiduciary rule and a modification of the

See Bruce Kelly, Election Poses Fresh Challenge for Reg BI, INVESTMENTNEWS
https://www.investmentnews.com/election-impact-reg-bi-198850.
60

61

(Nov.

2, 2020),

See id.

62 See Joseph Calabrese, Maxine Waters Presses Biden to Rescind Reg BI, JDSUPRA (Jan. 5, 2021),
https://www.j dsupra.com/legalnews/maxine-waters-presses-biden-to-rescind-4129063/.

C. Ryan Barber et al., What to Expect from the Biden Administration on the Regulatory Front, BENEFITSPRO (Feb.
2, 2021), https://www.benefitspro.com/2021/02/02/the-road-ahead-what-to-expect-from-the-biden-administrationon-the-regulatory-front-412-111040/.
63

64

D. Korth, A Big Change Could be Comingfor Reg BI, FINSUM (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/a-

big-change-could-be-coming-for-reg-bi-2021-03-02.
65 See id.
66

See id.

67

See id.

11

name could buy some time to analyze more data on Reg BI's effects. 68 Others have taken a similar,
yet more practical, stance by implying that the new SEC administration may "clarify the meaning
of best interest, and . .

do so in a way that represents a clear enhancement over suitability."6 9 The

overall consensus, however, is that Reg BI is here to stay. The following sections will outline
intended and unintended factors that may alter the SEC's perception of Reg BI and how those
factors may help or harm retail investors.

State FiduciaryStandards
It is possible that the SEC may never actually have to alter Reg BI or clarify the "best
interest" standard after several states legislated or proposed legislation that could impose a state
fiduciary standard on all BDs.7 0 If the original rule wasn't already confusing to retail investors,
these state laws are another wrinkle in the fold. After the announcement of Reg BI, some states
such as Massachusetts attempted to one-up the SEC by imposing their own fiduciary duty on
BDs.7 1 Since these state fiduciary duties are clearly inconsistent with Reg BI, legal challenges
based on preemption are all but inevitable. In the Reg BI adopting release, the SEC foreshadowed
these legal challenges by noting "[w]hether Regulation Best Interest would have any preemptive
effect on state law would be determined in future judicial proceedings and would depend on the
language and operation of the particular state law at issue."72 With such a controversial and
politically motivated regulation it is no surprise that the SEC included this language in the release.

68

See id.

69

Barber, supra note 63.

70 See Melkonyan, supra note 38.
71

See 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.200 (2020).

72

Regulation Best Interest, supra note 16 at 33, 435.

12

However, it is difficult to imagine the SEC moving forward with the Reg BI if the agency believed
that individual state legislation would win a preemption challenge in federal court.
If these state laws are challenged in court there are a few potential outcomes.73 The first is
that Reg BI will preempt state law and that the state fiduciary standards will be unenforceable. 7 4
Another scenario is that Reg BI sets a regulatory floor for BDs. 75 Said another way, the best interest
standard is simply the lowest duty a BD owes to a retail investor and individual states can enact
laws to raise that duty. 76 Although these state-by-state laws would "narrow the BD-IA duty
differential and reduce regulatory arbitrage," 77 the burden of cost to comply with these separate
rules would still be indirectly passed down to the retail investor. These indirect fees and costs were
a major, if not the foremost factor in deciding to keep the standards separate under the original
rule. Furthermore, investors who are already unaware or confused by their level of investor
protection on a national stage will surely be misguided when the level of care afford is stripped to
a state-by-state regime. On the other hand, investors in states that implement a fiduciary duty will
know that they will be legally protected no matter how they obtain investment advice.

Strict Enforcement
Since the June 30, 2020 implementation date, both FINRA and SEC examinations have
primarily focused on whether firms have "made a good faith effort to establish and implement

73 See Melkonyan, supra note 38.
4

See id. at 1608-10.

75 See id. at 1617.

76 See id.
77 See id. at 1629.

13

policies and procedures reasonably designed to comply with Reg BI."78 Starting in 2021, the SEC
announced that it will begin to conduct focused examinations; including taking a closer look at
how BDs have changed their product offerings, cost structures, and any documentation collected
in making such decisions.7 9 Thus, the grace period for making a "good faith effort" 80 has passed
and some believe that "literal compliance [with Reg BI] will be expected."

81

President Biden's

SEC chair nomination Gary Gessler has a reputation for being a tough regulator with an
"unwavering commitment to investor protection."

2

It is likely that Gensler, like other Democratic

SEC chairmen, will emphasize enforcement. 83 Some believe that this strict enforcement will put
"teeth" into Reg BI, but not overturn it. 84

During these focused examinations, BDs should expect a significant uptick in regulatory
actions. 85 Given that the intent of Reg BI was to hold BDs to a higher standard than suitability, the
new SEC will likely accompany these actions with strict penalties for both firms and their
employees. 86 This strict enforcement will likely be two-fold. First, going beyond the "good faith

78 Michelle Ong, FINRA Statement on SEC's OCIE Risk Alerts for Reg BI and Form CRS, FINRA (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://www.finra.org/media-center/newsreleases/2020/finra-statement-secs-ocie-risk-alerts-reg-bi-and-form-crs
79 Jake Martin, SEC Warns of 'More Focused Reg BI Enforcement Ahead', CITYWIRE (Dec. 22, 2020),

https://citywireusa.com/registered-investment-advisor/news/sec-warns-of-more-focused-reg-bi-enforcementahead/a1442648.
80
81

Id.

Tracey Longo, Reg BI Enforcement Expected to be Tougher Under Biden, FIN.

ADVISOR MAG. (Nov. 9, 2020),
https://www.fa-mag.com/news/reg-bi-enforcement-expected-to-be-tougher-under-biden-5887 1.html?print.

Mark Schoeff Jr., Gensler Expected to Put Teeth in Reg BI- Not Overturn it, INVESTMENTNEWS (Jan. 19, 2021),
https://www.investmentnews.com/gensler-expected-to-put-teeth-in-reg-bi-not-overturn-it-201499.
82

83

See id.

84

See id.

85 See Charles Riley and Michael Linden, The Key Open Questions That Will Determine the Next Four Years of SEC
JENNER
&
BLOCK
(Feb.
12,
2021),

Enforcement,

https://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/20714/original/The

KeyOpenQuestions.pdf?1613146078.

Marianna Shafir, Best Practices for Regulation Best Interest, BANKING EXCH. (Sept.
https://www.bankingexchange.com/compliance/item/8425-best-practices-for-regulation-best-interest
86

14

14, 2020),

effort"87 to "literal compliance""8 will give the SEC a first-hand opportunity to tighten the existing
rules. While a complete overhaul is not likely given the immense political capital it would take, 89
fine-tuning and clarifying language 90 will give BDs further guidance on how to best comply with
the regulation and protect their clients. Second, the published enforcement actions will notify
unexamined BDs of SEC priorities. These yet to be examined firms will utilize the actions to
tighten their policies and procedures, product offerings, and documentation to avoid any regulatory
actions or fines. Intentionally or not, this tightening will further merge the separate standards or
care and ultimately come closer to fulfilling the regulation's intent of protecting retail investors
without limiting choice.Focus on Investor Education
The entire focus and debate of Reg BI was done through industry members, regulatory
agencies, and the United States government - not retail investors. All of these individuals and
institutions worked off the assumption that retail investors sought choices in selecting products
and services from financial institutions. 9 1 The fact of the matter is, most retail investors are simply
looking for expert guidance in managing their retirement and savings.9 2 These investors are not
consciously choosing whether to utilize BD or IA services, but rather using the financial
professional recommended by friends or family or the broker at the local branch down their street. 93
Studies have shown that many retail investors do not know that a distinction between BDs and IAs
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even exists. 94 Despite their limited financial knowledge, the same study found that most retail
clients do trust their financial professional, 95 most likely because they trust the person who
recommended them originally.
The customer relationship summary (CRS) of Reg BI was intended to provide retail
investors with "simple, easy-to-understand information about the nature of their relationship with
their financial professional." 9 6 However, this short and easily accessible form given to retail
investors prior to and during the financial relationship may not be enough to adequately educate
investors about their afforded protections. Akin to an investment prospectus, it is easy to assume
that a majority of retail investors will never take the time to look through the document. Former
SEC chairman Arthur Levitt told the story of an SEC-sponsored focus group being asked what
information they use when deciding to invest in a mutual fund. 97 Their answers included friends,
family, financial professionals, the internet, financial publications, and television. 98 There was
only one person in the entire group that mentioned prospectus. 99 This same logic can easily be
translated to the CRS of Reg BI. The information about an investor's relationship with their
financial professional is adequately available, however, the financial services industry needs to
focus on if that information actually gets across to investors. In the words of Arthur Levitt,
"disclosure is NOT disclosure if it doesn't communicate." 10 0
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A simple solution to better communicate this disclosure is to raise the level of education
available to retail investors when they work with investment professionals. Simple touchpoints
such as mandatory discussions prior to opening accounts, videos, quizzes, etc. will allow the
investor to obtain the correct and necessary information before entering the relationship with the
financial professional. Further, requiring firms to offer continuing education for investors at
intervals after account opening can keep investors apprised to regulatory developments, market
conditions, and enable them to determine if their level of professional service is adequate for their
investment needs. Essentially, taking the education efforts one step further than the CRS may pay
future dividends.

V. CONCLUSION
The disagreement between financial industry participants and politicians highlights the fact
that although one-third of retail investors receive financial advice, 10 1 there is no perfect solution to
investor protection. The SEC has expressed that best interest is the best standard, yet industry
members rely more heavily on their own cost-burdens than on the actual intended benefits to the
retail investor. No matter where each affected parties' motivations lie, there has never been a time
where a need for investor protection is more prevalent. While there is still much to be decided in
the upcoming months it appears that, for now, Reg BI is here to stay.

1 See Fox, supra note 10.
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